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LOUISIANA VAGRANCY LAW-
CONSTITUTIONALLY UNSOUND
The several provisions of Louisiana's vagrancy law1 are de-
rived from three main sources. The first is the original common
law concept of vagrancy which was developed in fourteenth cen-
tury England because of grave economic conditions created by
the Black Death. The Statute of Labourers of 13492 deemed any-
one wandering from place to place without work a vagrant and
subjected offenders to harsh punishment. This first type of va-
grancy was, therefore, predicated on a theory of economic status
criminality.3
As early as the sixteenth century, however, the reason for
punishment under vagrancy laws was changed from one of eco-
nomic status to one of probable criminal status. For several rea-
sons, 4 vagrants, as originally defined, were felt to be likely
criminals and "crime prevention," rather than economic consid-
erations, became the justification for the continuance of such
laws. Although the reason for the punishment had changed, the
poor and shiftless were still in truth punished on the basis of
1. LA. I. S. 14:107 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1968, No. 647, § 1:
"The following persons are and shall be guilty of vagrancy:
"(1) Habitual drunkards; or
"(2) Persons who live in houses of ill fame or who habitually associate with
prostitutes ; or
"(3) Able-bodied persons who beg or solicit alms, provided that this article
shall not apply to persons soliciting alms for bona fide religious, charitable or
eleemosynary organizations with the authorization thereof; or
"(4) Habitual gamblers or persons who for the most part maintain them-
selves by gambling; or
"(5) Able-bodied persons without lawful means of support who do not seek
employment and take employment when it is available to them; or
"(6) Able-bodied persons of the age of majority who obtain their support
gratis from persons receiving old age pensions or from persons receiving welfare
assistance from the state; or
"(7) Persons who loaf the streets habitually or who frequent the streets
habitually at late or unusual hours of the night, or who loiter around any public
place of assembly, without lawful business or reason to be present; or
"(8) Persons found in or near any structure, movable, vessel, or private
grounds without being able to account for their lawful presence therein; or
"(9) Prostitutes.
"Whoever commits the crime of vagrancy shall be fined not more than two
hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both."
2. 23 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1349).
3. 91 C.J.S. Vagrancy § 1(a) (1955) : "At common law, a person is deemed
a vagrant who goes about from place to place without visible means of support,
is idle, and, although able to work for his maintenance, refuses to do so, and
lives without labor or on the charity of others." A variation of this theme can be
seen in subsection 5 of Louisiana's vagrancy statute. This subsection is, in effect,
a paraphrase of the original Statute of Labourers.
4. ,See Comment, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 102, 105 (1962).
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their economic status.5 In the name of crime prevention, vagran-
cy statutes over the years were constantly expanded in order to
include not only the jobless, but almost every type of petty crim-
inal;r this is the second source of several Louisiana provisions.
Guilt, as before, was not predicated upon any act, but on a
person's status-in this case, his criminal status. It was while
in this form that the vagrancy concept was adopted by almost
every American jurisdiction7 and, in the United States at least,"
this idea of status criminalityD has remained largely unchanged. 10
5. For a rather recent defense of vagrancy laws based on the crime preven-
tion theory, see Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1958).
As stated in note 3 supra, LA. R.S. 14:107(5) is closely related to the original
Statute of Labourers, which was based solely on economic grounds. That the
justification for this type of purely economic status offense later became "crime
prevention" is seen in the official comment to LA. R.S.14:107(5) (1950), which
states that the subsection was "enacted to prevent men who are able to work
from idling and wandering about the community, and becoming drones, thieves
or charges upon the public." While crime prevention is still, therefore, bandied
about by the authorities as justification for such laws, this is not the true state
of affairs. It has been shown that vagrancy arrests have no real connection with
the prevention of crime. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956). Such laws in actuality have several purposes far
divorced from any reasonable theory of "crime prevention" : (1) to "clean up the
town" by getting the bums off the streets ; (2) to put "on ice" those persons
suspected of crime but against whom no evidence can be produced; (3) to, per-
haps not intentionally, harass disadvantaged minority groups. Douglas, Vagrancy
and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960) ; Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law
and Its Administration, 37 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956) ; Comment, 37 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 102 (1962) ; Note, HARV. CIv. RTs.-CIv. LID. L. REV. 439 (1967-68).
6. One of the many examples of the widening of the vagrancy offense could
have at one time been found in MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO, ch. 193, § 1. This
ordinance provided, in part, that "all persons . . . who shall collect in bodies or
crowds for unlawful purposes, or for any purpose, to the annoyance or disturb-
ance of other persons; all persons who are idle or dissolute and go about begging;
all persons who use or exercise any juggling or other unlawful games or plays;
all persons who are found in houses of ill-fame or gaming houses; all persons
lodging in or found at any time in sheds, barns, stables, or unoccupied buildings,
or lodging in the open air and not giving a good account of themselves . . . all
persons who stand, loiter, or stroll about in any place in the city, waiting or
seeking to obtain money or other valuable things from others by trick or fraud,
or to aid or assist therein ; all persons that shall engage in any fraudulent
scheme, devise or trick to obtain money or other valuable things in any place in
the city . . . all touts, ropers, steerers, or cappers, so called, for any gambling
room or house who shall ply or attempt to ply their calling on any public way in
the city . . . all persons who shall have or carry any pistol, knife, dirk, knuckles,
slingshot, or other dangerous weapon cancealed [sic] on or about their persons
. . . shall be deemed guitly of disorderly conduct . . ." Although this was a "dis-
orderly conduct" ordinance, it was derived from the vagrancy concept. The ordi-
nance was declared unconstitutional because of vagueness in Landry v. Daley,
280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ill. 1968). Subsections 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9 of Louisiana's
vagrancy statute are further examples of the broadening of the vagrancy offense.
7. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1203, 1206 (1953).
8. England abandoned status criminality for conduct criminality in The
Vagrancy Act of 1824, 5 Geo. 4, Ch. 83.
9. This very short historical analysis of the vagrancy offense is taken from
a more exhaustive study in Comment, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102 (1962). Other ex-
cellent histories may be found in Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Adminis-
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The third source of Louisiana's vagrancy law is one of the
few types of conduct criminality that found its way into the
typical vagrancy statute-the offense of loitering.11 While such
a provision proscribes an act rather than a status, it is, because
of the "crime prevention" justification, used almost exclusively
against the poor and those reputed to be or look to be crimi-
nals.12 This offense is thus a derivation from the vagrancy con-
cept since its use is based upon a person's economic or criminal
status.1
The whole thrust of Louisiana's vagrancy law is not the pun-
ishment of crime, but the prevention of crime. For the fulfill-
ment of this purpose, many states, like Louisiana, made their
vagrancy provisions rather broad in scope.14 As is often the case
with broadly drawn penal statutes, some very basic civil liber-
ties15 are often jeopardized in the exercise of vagrancy-type
laws.'0 While the making of regulations for the prevention of
crime is certainly within the police power of the state, it has
often been stated that the power to regulate must be exercised
so as not to unjustifiably interfere with protected freedoms.1 7
In the past, however, the courts have had little reason to
worry about this problem because the ratio of vagrancy arrests
to judicial appeals has always been extremely low.' The reasons
for this are not difficult to imagine. 19 The fact is that, until ap-
proximately ten years ago, the courts had not been faced with
many well-drawn constitutional challenges to these statutes and
tration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956); Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9
HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1958) ; Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds--Old Con-
cepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 557 (1960).
10. California, New York, and Illinois have recently switched from status
to conduct criminality in their vagrancy-type statutes. CALIF. PENAL CODE § 647
(Supp. 1966) ; N.Y. REV. PENAL CODE § 240.35(6); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 35--
1 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1961). Unfortunately, however, the New York and Califor-
nia statutes were poorly drafted and still retain features that are of doubtful
constitutionality. See note 112 infra.
11. The loitering provisions in LA. R.S. 14:107 (1950) are subsections 7
and 8.
12. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. REV.
603 (1956).
13. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960).
14. For an analysis of the vagrancy-type laws of all the states, see Sherry,
Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALIF.
L. REV. 557 (1960) ; Comment, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102 (1962).
15. See text accompanying notes 22-27 infra.
16. "Vagrancy-type" is the term used because these common law vagrancy
derived offenses are often gathered into disorderly conduct statutes.
17. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288 (1964).
18. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV.
603, 645 (1.956).
19. Ignorance and poverty seem, as would be expected, to be the main ob-
stacles to judicial appeals on such arrests. See id. at 647.
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ordinances. Considering the relatively primitive state of civil
rights and liberties just a decade ago, it is not surprising that
most of the challenges that did reach the upper courts were
struck down.2 0 With the recent upheaval in the field of civil
rights and liberties, however, has come not only several state
decisions invalidating vagrancy statutes and ordinances, 21 but
also many more constitutional challenges to such laws.
Successful attacks on vagrancy provisions have been made
on several grounds: (1) void for vagueness or arbitrary enforce-
ment under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment,22 (2) unreasonable restraint of liberty under the thir-
teenth amendment,23 (3) cruel and unusual punishment under
the eighth and fourteenth amendments,2 4 and (4) void as of-
fending due process of the fourteenth amendment by making
status a crime.2 . In theory, some vagrancy-type provisions could
be challenged on the grounds that they offend the equal protec-
tion guarantee of the fourteenth amendment,2 6 and one state
court has recently held that punishment for economic or crim-
inal status is no longer within the police power of the state. 27
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has rarely
spoken out in this area, but the indications are that the Court
will support these decisions.
28
This Comment will explore those provisions of Louisiana's
vagrancy statute that are open to constitutional attack. For
analysis purposes, the provisions will be separated into those
that would be commonly considered as true vagrancy provisions
and those that are, in fact, loitering provisions.
Vagrancy
"The following persons are and shall be guilty of vagrancy:
(1) Habitual drunkards;"
In the past, most provisions of this type have been attacked
on the ground that they were void for vagueness as offending
20. Annots., 111 A.L.R. 68 (1937), 92 A.L.R. 1228 (1934), 91 C.J.S. Va-
grancy § 2(i) (1955).
21. This statement is supported by the text accompanying notes 29-99 infra.
22. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939) ; People v. Belcastro, 356
111. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934).
23. St. Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo. 541, 31 S.W. 915 (1895).
24. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
25. Parker v. Municipal Judge of City of Las Vegas, 427 P.2d 642 (Nev.
1967) ; City of Reno v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 427 P.2d 4 (Nev. 1967).
26. Note, 20 ALA. L. REV. 141, 146 (1967).
27. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 28 N.Y.S.2d 739
(1967).
28. See text accompanying notes 35-41 infra.
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the due process of the fourteenth amendment. The challenge has
centered around the word "habitual," or, as in most other pro-
visions of this genre, "common." The leading case on the void
for vagueness argument in this area is Lanzetta v. New Jer-
sey.29 Here, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that made
membership in a "gang" one of the prerequisites for being
declared, and punished as, a "gangster." The Court felt that
the word "gang" had so many possible meanings that no one
could know with any certainty precisely what activity would
be deemed illegal, and that therefore the statute was invalid
under due process.
When used in a provision such as we are concerned with
here, it would seem that the same argument would apply to the
words "common" or "habitual." However, three later state deci-
sions held that the word "common" was not too vague.30 One
of these decisions- 1 has since been overruled by In re Newbern.32
There, the California Supreme Court held that the word "com-
mon" had too many possible definitions, and in dicta said that
the word "habitual" would be no improvement. The court found
that the statute failed "to include a standard of what inordinate
use of intoxicants makes a person a common drunkard . . . the
statute leaves to the individual judge or jury the determination
of the meaning of the law .... ,, 3
While this decision indicates that Louisiana's "habitual
drunkard" provision could very well be challenged on vagueness
grounds, an attack which could have a much greater effect on
the provision 3 would be that it is invalid as cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Robinson v. California0 was the first case to open the door to
29. 306 U. S. 451 (1939).
30. People v. Daniel, 168 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 788, 337 P.2d 247 (1959)
State v. Cherry, 224 Md. 144, 167 A.2d 328 (1961); State v. McCorvey, 262
Minn. 361, 114 N.W.2d 703 (1962).
31. People v. Daniel, 168 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 788, 337 P.2d 247 (1959).
32. Cal.2d 786, 350 P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1960)
33. Id. at 796, 350 P.2d at 124, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
34. It would be difficult, but not impossible, for a state to sufficiently de-
fine "habitual" or "common." Thus the vagueness argument has only limited use
to those who wish to have habitual drunkard laws declared altogether unconsti-
tutional. The problem is compounded by the fact that the_Supreme Court has
been extremely reluctant to accept a case challenging a vagrancy provision on
the grounds of vagueness. See Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U. S. 598 (1968),
writ dismissed as improvidently granted; Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U. S.
252 (1966), writ dismissed as improvidently granted; Edelman v. California,
344 U.S. 357 (1953), writ dismissed as improvidently granted. When the Court
does accept such a case, it makes every effort to avoid the constitutional ques-
tion: Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1960).
35. 370 U. S. 660 (1962).
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such a challenge. A California law deemed it a punishable of-
fense to be a drug addict. The United States Supreme Court felt
that drug addiction was a disease and held that a state could
no more punish someone for having the status of a drug addict
than it could punish someone for having a common cold. It
was held that such a conviction would be cruel and unusual
punishment.
Two federal appellate courts 36 then held that conviction of a
chronic alcoholic on a charge of public drunkenness also would
violate the "cruel and unusual punishment" protection. It was
held that chronic alcoholism, like drug addiction, was a disease
that gave rise to an uncontrollable compulsion to drink. The
courts felt that drunkenness was but a symptom of a disease
or evidence of a status, and therefore should not be punished.
The United States Supreme Court stopped short of this posi-
tion, however, in Powell v. Texas.37 The Court in a 5-4 decision
insisted that Robinson stood only for the narrow holding that
a state could not punish a person for his status-but that it could
punish a person for his actions, whether or not that act was a
characteristic of the status.
Although some commentators felt that Robinson stood for
the proposition that the only personal status protected from
punishment is that which is retained under some sort of com-
pulsion,' 18 the court in Powell emphasized the fact that the
voluntariness of the acquired status had nothing to do with
their decision in Robinson. That decision was simply that the
state could not prosecute a person because of his status, regard-
less of whether that status was voluntarily or involuntarily
acquired and retained. ", As was said by Justice Marshall in
the Court's opinion,
"The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties
may be inflicted only if the accused has committed some act,
has engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest
in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms,
36. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver
v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
37. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
38. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver
v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). Note, 20 ALA. L.REV. 141, 144 (1967).
39. The Court in Powell spent a lot of effort in attempting to determine
whether or not alcoholism could be defined as a disease and whether or not ap-
pellant was under an irresistible urge to drink. But, judging from what the Court
later said (see text accompanying note 40 infra), it seems that all of this dis-
cusssion was not a factor in the decision.
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has committed some actus reus. It thus does not deal with
the question of whether conduct cannot constitutionally be
punished because it is, in some sense 'involuntary' or oc-
casioned by a compulsion."40
In dicta, all nine justices seemingly agreed that if Powell had
been arrested because he was a chronic alcoholic, the case would
have been brought under the Robinson rule and the statute
authorizing such arrest declared unconstitutional. It would be
of no merit for the state to claim that the person arrested under
such a statute was not driven by an overwhelming physical or
psychological compulsion to drink. As stated in Powell, volun-
tariness is an irrelevant factor when the state has made a status,
rather than an act, the only ingredient of a criminal offense.
Since the Court is not limiting this question to involuntary
status, there is no reason why the rationale of the Robinson and
Powell decisions could not be used to attack the constitutionality
of all status offenses. Justice Black in concurring opinion states
that
"[A]ny attempt to explain Robinson as based solely on the
lack of voluntariness encounters a number of logical dif-
ficulties. Other problems raised by status crimes are in no
way involved when the state attempts to punish for conduct,
and these other problems were, in my view, the controlling
aspects of our decision .... Punishment for a status is par-
ticularly obnoxious.., because it involves punishment for a
mere propensity, a desire to commit an offense ... This is a
situation universally sought to be avoided in our criminal
law; the fundamental requirement that some action be
proved is solidly established . . ."41 (footnotes omitted)
It seems only a matter of time, therefore, until Louisiana's
"habitual drunkard" provision will be declared unconstitutional
on the grounds of cruel and unusual punishment.
"(2) Persons who live in houses of ill fame or who habitually
associate with prostitutes;"
Laws similar to the first part of this provision have generally
been upheld when under constitutional attack.42 Legislation sim-
40. Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 533 (1968).
41. Id. at 542, 543.
42. Annot., 92 A.L.R. 1228, 1233 (1934). It has been reasonably argued,
however, that such a provision has no place in the criminal law because "while
it may be said that the resident of the house of ill fame perhaps ought to be
made [sic] punishable, at least for his deplorable taste, such establishments have
long been outlawed and are subject to speedy closure." Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues
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ilar to the second part, which predicates "criminality upon the
criminal repute or fame of the accused or his associates has
generally been held violative of rights secured by state and
federal constitutional provisions. ' 43  Missouri courts, for ex-
ample, have held consistently that a provision making associa-
tion with certain elements of society a punishable offense is un-
constitutional, 44 even if the provision states that the associating
must be done with the intent of committing a crime.45 The ra-
tionale of these cases is that such laws are an unreasonable
invasion of personal liberty.46
"If it can be made a penal offense for a person to associate
with those of his own choosing, however disreputable they
may be, when not in the furtherance of some overt act of
public indecency or in the perpetration of some crime, then
it necessarily follows that by the same authority he may be
compelled to associate with persons not of his own choosing.
' '
1
7
and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALiF. L. REv.. 557, 567
(1960.)
43. Annot., 92 A.L.R. 1.228 (1934). See 55 Am. JUR. Vagrancy § 6 (1946).
Contra, Ex parte McCue, 7 Cal. App. 765, 96 P. 110 (1908) ; State v. McCor-
mick, 142 La. 580, 77 So. 288 (1918) ; Morgan v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 731,
191 S.E. 791 (1937). In Jenkins v. United States, 146 A.2d 444 (D.C. Mun. App.
1958), the court upheld a statute which declared that a narcotics user who is
seen in the company of other addicts is guilty of being a vagrant. The court
claimed that the statute did not interfere unreasonably with any citizen's rights
of movement or association, but conceded that "it does lay restrictions on one
who is a narcotic drug user . . . and declares him a vagrant in certain areas of
behavior and association." Id. at 447. The only conclusion that can be drawn is
that this court considered drug addicts as second-class citizens.
44. St. Louis v. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582 (1873) ; Lancaster v. Reed, 207 S.W. 868
(Mo. App. 1919).
45. Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 36 S.W. 628 (1896) ; St. Louis v. Roche,
128 Mo. 541, 31 S.W. 915 (1895) ; But see People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315, 199
N.E. 495 (1946).
46. Cf. Hechinger v. Maysville, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 486, 57 S.W. 619 (1900)
People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315, 324, 199 N.E. 495, 498 (1936) ("Mere association
of people of ill repute with no intent to breach the peace or to plan or commit
crime is too vague a provision to constitute an offense.") ; City of Watertown v.
Christnach, 39 S.D. 286, 164 N.W. 62 (1917). The United States Supreme Court
has recently discovered that there is some sort of peripheral right to "freedom of
association" to be found in the Constitution. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); NAACP ex rel. Patterson v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). None of
the decisions have, however, dealt with the question of the prohibition of personal
associations. It has been suggested that if the Court ever steps into an area in
which certain personal associations are prohibited, it would be advised to use due
process or equal protection arguments rather than freedom of association. See
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom. of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1
(1964). In any event, the indications from those "association" cases the Court
has decided are that any law prohibiting personal association would come under
rigid scrutiny, and that the danger resulting from the association had better ap-
proach the danger inherent in Communism. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961).
47. St. Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo. 541, 546, 31 S.W. 915, 916-17 (1895).
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A renowned case in this area is People v. Belcastro.4 There,
an Illinois statute declared that anyone who associated with
reputed habitual criminals or persons who habitually carried
weapons was, and could be punished as, a "vagabond." The
court held that such a law gave administrative officers ar-
bitrary and discriminatory powers and was also an unreasonable
denial of liberty without due process.
A very recent decision in Nevada 49 indicates that a new
ground for invalidating such statutes has been found. The court
held unconstitutional an ordinance which deemed it disorderly
conduct for persons of ill repute to assemble for an unlawful
purpose and made their reputation prima facie evidence of their
intent. The court said that the statute violated due process by
making the mere status of certain persons the grounds for pun-
ishment. Unfortunately for analysis purposes, the court did not
explain its use of the due process argument. Because of the
United States Supreme Court decision in Powell v. Texas, how-
ever, it certainly seems that in addition to the powerful argument
that LA. R.S. 107(2) is an affront to personal liberty, the fact
that the provision makes status an offense' ° raises grave doubts
as to its constitutionality-whether the problem is approached
on the grounds of due process or cruel and unusual punishment.
"(5) Able-bodied persons without lawful means of support
who do not seek employment and take employment when it is
available to them;"
This type of provision is a true derivative of the original
common law crime of vagrancy. In earlier years, there was
little doubt that the state could control those who refused to go
to work5' in order to keep them from becoming "drones, thieves
or charges upon the public." 5' Harsh statutes of this order have
been challenged, however, on several grounds, and a number of
these challenges have been successful.
As early as 1912 in Ex parte Smith,53 an Ohio court over-
48. 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934). Accord, People v. Alterie, 356 Ill.
276, 190 N.E. 305 (1934). Contra, on nearly identical facts, State v. Gaynor, 119
N.J.L. 582, 197 A. 360 (1938).
49. City of Reno v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct, 427 P.2d 4 (Nev. 1967).
50. This provision does not create a status offense in that the words "ha-
bitually associate" allow a person to be arrested even if at the time of arrest he
is not commiting the act of associating with a prostitute. Of course, removal of
the words "habitually associate" would not save the provision because it would
still be invalid as an unreasonable restraint on liberty.
51. Annot., 111 A.L.R. 68 (1937).
52. LA. R.S. 14:107(5) comment (1950).
53. 13 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 278 (1912).
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threw a provision almost identical to Louisiana's law54 on
grounds of vagueness. The very existence of Louisiana's provi-
sion points out the fact that this decision was ahead of its
time ;5 but two very recent decisions have turned to the rationale
of Smith and invalidated this type of vagrancy provision because
of vagueness. In Baker v. Binder,"6 a federal district court ruled
unconstitutional a statute declaring that those persons who
habitually loitered and refused to work were "vagrants." The
court felt that the statute was a catch-all which was not specific
as to what it wished to prohibit or what type of conduct would
violate it. The Massachusetts court in Alegata v. Commonwealth5T
cited Lanzetta v. New Jersey5s in support of its recent decision
to invalidate a Massachusetts statute, which was similar to Lou-
isiana's provision, on several grounds including vagueness.
Vagueness has not been the only objection forwarded against
this type of provision. In the 1920 decision of Ex parte Hud-
gins,5-9 a West Virginia statute that required every ablebodied
man to work at least thirty-six hours a week was found to be
an unreasonable restraint on liberty. In defining "liberty," the
court said:
"As defined by Blackstone, 'it consists in the power of loco-
motion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to
whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.' "60
In 1967, New York's highest court in Fenster v. Leary"' held
as an improper exercise of the police power a statute that
defined a vagrant as "a person who, not having visible means to
maintain himself, lives without employment."62 It felt that
whatever earlier justification there was for the law, it was
obvious from all the governmental welfare and poverty programs
that the government had abandoned vagrancy laws as a means
54. 011O GEN. CODE § 13409 defined a vagrant as "whoever, being a male
person able to perform manual labor, has not made reasonable effort to procure
employment or has refused to labor at reasonable prices, is a vagrant . . ."
55. Adamson v. Hoblitzell, 279 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1955). See Handler v. City
& County of Denver, 102 Colo. 53, 77 P.2d 132 (1938); Fonte v. State, 213
Tenn. 204, 373 S.W.2d 445 (1963).
56. 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
57. 231 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1967)
58. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
59. 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S.E. 327 (1920).
60. Id. at 529, 103 S.E. at 329.
61. 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967). Accord, Ale-
gata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E. 201, 206 (Mass. 1967).
62. N.Y. CODE CRIM. P. § 887(1).
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to persuade the unemployed poor to go to work.63 The New York
court also expressed doubts as to the law's constitutionality since
it made status a basis for a penal offense. Although the court
chose not delve into this problem, other courts have done so
and prior to 1967 most of them found nothing wrong with
punishing the status of being voluntarily jobless.64 The Nevada
Supreme Court in Parker v. Municipal Judge of City of Las
Vegas65 has broken with this tradition, however, in holding that
a law making the status of poverty grounds for conviction of-
fended due process.,! A Colorado court in State v. Jones-7 cited
Robinson v. California65 in support of a similar holding, even
though Robinson had approached the problem by means of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Once again, while there are excellent grounds for all of
these challenges, the most powerful of them is the "status"
argument. As has been suggested, the Supreme Court in Powell
v. Texas seems to be preparing for a full scale assault on all
status offenses.19 Furthermore, although the Court has not yet
faced this precise question, individual justices over the years
have displayed a marked distaste for the original common law
type vagrancy offense .7 One of the strongest statements was
63. The court charged that the only persons picked up for vagrancy were
derelicts who wandered into nice neighborhoods, and people suspected of crime
but on whom the police had no evidence-and that the first use was more of a
problem for the public welfare people, and that the second was unconstitutional.
64. City of New Orleans v. Postek, 180 La. 1048, 158 So. 553 (1935). See
Ex parte Toni \ Tong, 122 Cal. App. 672, 10 P.2d 797 (1932) ; Handler v. City &
County of Denver, 102 Colo. 53, 77 P.2d 132 (1938).
65. 427 P'.2d 642 (Nev. 1967).
6. ,See Commonwealth v. DeCarlo, 2 CitiA. L. lRii'r. 2006 (Pa. Super.
1967). Cf. Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
67. 2 CALr. L. Rp'rt. 2498 (Colo. County Ct. 1968).
68. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1902).
69. Actually, the decision in Powell is not the only indication that the
United States Supreme Court will not look favorably upon status type offenses.
It has been shown that the reasoning of several Court decisions dealing with the
punishment of Communists could by easy analogy be applied to the type of status
offenses being discussed here. See Note, 20 ALA. L. REV. 141, 145 (1967). It
should also be noted that there is a very potent argument against status offenses
that apparently has not yet been discovered by the courts. As discussed in Note,
s "pra at 146, the "equal protection" scheme advanced by Tussman & tenBroek,
'fihe Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAmIF. L. REV. 341 (1949), when applied
to status offenses, indicates that such laws violate the equal protection guarantee
of the fourteenth amendment.
70. Justice Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion in Winters v. New York,
333 U. S. 507, 540 (1948), referred to vagrancy statutes in these words: "These
statutes are in a class by themselves, in view of the familiar abuses to which
they are put . . . Definiteness is designedly avoided so as to allow the net to be
cast at large, to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes
of police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense."
Speaking for the majority in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941),
Justice Byrnes stated that "we do not think that it will now be seriously con-
tended that because a person is without employment and without funds lie con-
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made by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Edwards
v. People of State of California:71
"We should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a
man's mere property status, without more, cannot be used
by a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of
the United States... The mere state of being without funds
is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race,
creed or color. ' '1 -
From any number of constitutional grounds, therefore, it would
seem that LA. R.S. 107(5) will not stand before a constitutional
onslaught.
Other Provisions
Subsections 4 and 9, which declare habitual gamblers and
prostitutes "vagrants," are probably invalid in that they make
a person's mere status the basis of a criminal offense. 73 If the
Louisiana courts decide that the "houses of ill fame" in the
first part of Subsection 2 do not have to be proven as actual
places of prostitution, the provision is invalid because it makes
"reputation" a basis for punishment.T 4 Even correctly inter-
preted, there could be some question as to whether a state can
validly prohibit the status of living in, as opposed to running
or supporting, a house of prostitution. Subsection 6 is some
sort of "welfare" regulation, and as such seems to suffer from
some serious constitutional defects. These defects, however, in-
volve problems beyond the scope of this Comment and will not,
therefore, be explored.
Subsection 3 should be in no constitutional difficulty-provi-
sions such as this have been invariably upheld by the courts. 5
Of the seven provisions in Louisiana's vagrancy law already
explored, however, at least five of them are in definite consti-
tutional jeopardy.
stitutes a 'moral pestilence.' Poverty and immorality are not synonymous." Jus-
tices Black and Douglas dissented from the denial of writs in Edelman v. Cali-
fornia, 344 U.S. 357 (1953), stating that a statute making a "dissolute" person
a vagrant was too vague. Justice Douglas has for years spoken out against vagrancy
provisions. See Hicks v. California, 383 U.S. 252 (1966) (dissenting from denial
of writs) ; Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. I (1960).
71. 314 U. S. 160 (1941).
72. Id. at 184, 185.
73. See discussion of Powell v. Texas in text accompanying note 37 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra.
75. Annot., 92 A.L.R. 1228, 1233 (1934) ; 91 C.J.S. Vagrancy § 1-2 (1955).
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Loitering
"(7) Persons who loaf the streets habitually or who frequent
the streets habitually at late or unusual hours of the night..."
Loitering provisions differ from the status type of vagrancy
provision in that their purpose is not to get people back to work,
but to prohibit certain types of acts which, if not prohibited,
are supposedly an open invitation to crime. Even though such
provisions deal with an act rather than a status, they still must
undergo rigid constitutional scrutiny by the courts. And in
recent years, this scrutiny has greatly narrowed the scope of
activities that loitering statutes can prohibit.
This first part of Subsection 7 would appear to be unconstitu-
tional on its face. With rare exceptions, provisions similar to
this have been consistently invalidated by the courts.
7 6 Most
of the cases in this area are concerned with the vagueness of the
word "loiter" and its synonyms, such as: "standing, 7 7 "stroll-
ing, '17  "wandering,"' 0  "saunter,""' "lounge," "idle, 's 2  or
loaf."' 3 Almost invariably it has been held that such words,
standing by themselves, offer no standard by which a person
could discover when a perfectly legal action became illegal.
8 4
Other decisions have invalidated similar provisions on the
76. Cf. Phillips v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. App. 2d 453,
75 P.2d 548 (1938) ; Adamson v. Hoblitzell, 279 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1955) ; Tuns-
ley v. City of Richmond, 202 Va. 707, 119 S.E.2d 488 (1961). Phillips was later
ignored by In re Cregler, 56 Cal.2d 308, 363 P.2d 305, 14 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1961), and dismissed by In re Huddleson, 229 Cal. App. 2d 618, 40 Cal. Rptr.
581 (1964). In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court in Shut-
tlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1967), held that an ordinance
drafted substantially like that approved in Tunsley violated the fourteenth
amendment.
77. Headly v. Selkowitz, 171 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1965) ; City of St. Louis v.
Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908).
78. Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1965).
79. Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968), writ dismissed as improvi-
dently granted. Justices White and Harlan dissented from the dismissal of this
writ.
80. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 546, 91 N.E.2d 666 (1950).
81. City of St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908) ; People
v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 151 N.E.2d 871, 176 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1958).
82. Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931) Soles v. City of Vi-
dalia, 92 Ga. App. 839, 90 S.E.2d 249 (1955).
83. Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931) Soles v. City of Vi-
dalia, 92 Ga. App. 839, 90 S.E.2d 249 (1955) ; Ex parte Mittelstaedt, 164 Tex.
Crim. 115, 279 S.W.2d 153 (1957).
84. Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931) ; Baker v. Binder, 274
F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky 1967) ; People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 151 N.E.2d 871,
176 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1958); City of Cleveland v Baker, 167 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio
App. 1960). Accord, Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1965) ; Common-
wealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 546, 91 N.E.2d 666 (1950). Cf. Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87 (1967) ; City of Seattle v. Drew, 423 P.2d 522
(Wash. 1967).
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grounds that they were an unreasonable restraint on liberty. 5
The word "habitual" in Louisianas provision does not save it-
to prohibit even habitual loafing would be an unreasonable
restraint."'! Just as part of the essence of liberty is the right
of "locomotion," so is the right of non-locomotion8 7 a part of per-
sonal liberty. "It is a matter of common knowledge ... that the
majority of mankind spend a goodly part of their waking hours
in whiling or idling the time away."88
Provisions such as this are usually held constitutional only
if (1) words similar to "for the intent of doing an unlawful
act" are either in the statute " or are added by the court in its
interpretation of the statute, 0 or (2) if the prohibition is
limited to places where children congregate, such as schools.s1
Even this last possibility is in some doubt. It has been held that
such a provision is an unreasonable restraint on liberty,'9 2 and
the California Supreme Court in a recent decision held that a
showing of the act of loitering around a school will not be suf-
ficient for conviction if it was not also shown that the person
was loitering with the intent of committing a crime.9
"(7) (O)r who loiter around any public place of assembly,
without lawful business or reason to be present;"
It should be evident that Subsection 7 would be held consti-
tutional by most courts only if the words "without lawful busi-
85. Soles v. City of Vidalia, 92 Ga. App. 839, 90 S.E.2d 249 (1955) ; City
of St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908) ; City of Akron v. Eff-
land, 112 Ohio App. 15, N.E.2d 285 (1960).
86. Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931). Notice also that the
word "habitual" turns this provision into a status-type of offense which would
be unconstitutional under the Powell v. Texas rationale discussed in text accom-
panying note 37 supra.
87. See text accompanying note 45 sapra. It should be stated here that it is
not universally agreed that Americans have the right to travel from place to place
as they please. In Ex parte Cutler, I Cal. App. 2d 273, 36 P.2d 441 (1934), the
California court made this rather unfortunate statement: "It is within the legis-
lative power to define vagrancy and to provide that those who indulge in point-
less, useless wandering from place to place within the state without any excuse
for such roaming other than the impulse generated by what is sometimes denom-
inated wanderlust, shall come within the definition and that such individuals
may properly be penalized as the statute ordains." Id. at 280, 36 P.2d at 445.
88. Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171, 173 (9th Cir. 1931).
89. Johnson v. Florida, 202 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1967); Soles v. City of Vi-
dalia, 92 Ga. App. 839, 90 S.E.2d 249 (1955); City of Akron v. Effland, 112
Ohio App. 15, 174 N.E.2d 285 (1960).
90. In re Cregler, 56 Cal.2d 308, 363 P.2d 305, 14 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1961).
91. State v. Starr, 57 Ariz. 270, 113 P.2d 356 (1941) ; Phillips v. Municipal
Court of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, 75 P.2d 548 (1938) ; People v. John-
son, 6 N.Y.2d 549, 161 N.E.2d 9, 190 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1959).
92. Ex parte Mittelstaedt, 164 Tex. Crim. 115, 297 S.W.2d 153 (1957) ; cf.
People v. Van Wong, 16 Cal. App. 821, 332 P.2d 872 (1958).
93. In re Huddleson, 229 Cal. App. 618, 40 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1964).
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ness or reason" could be interpreted as meaning "with the
intent of committing an unlawful act." As has been already
pointed out, mere loitering or loafing cannot be made illegal;
and therefore being around a public place for the purpose of
whiling away the time or taking in some air must be considered
"lawful business. ' ' 94 Therefore a person can lawfully be arrested
under this provision only if the policeman has probable cause to
believe that the suspect intends to commit some criminal offense
and not only the act of mere loitering.15
"He must be deemed innocent until his voluntary conduct
overcomes the apparent presumed innocence of his move-
ments by disclosing a purpose to violate some law .... 9;
Any other interpretation, of course, would allow arrest on suspi-
cion, which has long been held unconstitutional.-7 In any event,
such a necessary interpretation emasculates the provision and
makes it rather useless.
"(8) Persons found in or near any structure, movable, vessel,
or private grounds without being able to account for their lawful
presence therein;"
Subsection 8 at first glance seems to be a typical "satisfactory
account" s type of loitering statute. A second reading, however,
brings one to the realization that this provision has fatal defi-
ciencies. While this subsection seems to be limited in scope by
requiring that the suspect be found "in or near any structure,
movable, vessel, or private grounds" before he must account for
his actions, one realizes on reflection that it is virtually impos-
sible for a person to avoid being in or near at least one of these
objects. What this provision actually does is authorize a police-
man to stop any person at any time and at any place for no valid
reason whatsoever and demand that the person account for his
94. But see Ex parte Cutler, 1 Cal. App. 2d 273, 36 P.2d 441 (1934) ; State
v. Grenz, 26 Wash.2d 764, 175 P.2d 633 (1947).
95. Dominquez v. City and County of Denver, 363 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1961)
Johnson v. Florida, 202 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1967) (concurring opinion) ; Alegata v.
Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1967) ; City of Portland v. Goodwin, 187
Ore. 409, 210 P.2d 577, on rehearing, 187 Ore. 429, 210 P.2d 586 (1949) ; City
of Seattle v. Drew, 423 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1967).
96. City of Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210 P.2d 577, on rehearing,
187 Ore. 429, 430, 210 P.2d 586 (1949).
97. Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 D.C. App. 229, 48 L.R.A. 220 (1900) ; Ale-
gata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1967) ; Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78
Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579 (1889).
98. These types of provisions usually require that a person acting in an
suspicious manner be prepared to give a police officer a "satisfactory account"
of what he is doing. For discussions on the constitutionality of such provisions,
see Murtagh, Status Offenses and Due Process of Law, 36 FORDiAm L. REV. 51
337 (1968) ; Notes, 20 ALA. L. REv. 141 (1967), 4 ARiZ. L. RaV. 284 (1962-63).
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being there. If the officer does not like the explanation given
to him, he is allowed to make an arrest. This provision is invalid
not only for vagueness and as a grossly unreasonable restraint on
liberty, but also because it authorizes the police to arrest and
search all persons whom they think are "suspicious." 99
Conclusions and Suggested Reforms
As has been suggested, those Louisiana vagrancy provisions
that make a person's status grounds for punishment' 0 are open
to a variety of constitutional objections, the most potent of
which seems to be the cruel and unusual punishment argument
recently advanced by the United States Supreme Court. It has
been shown that arrests for this species of vagrancy have no
real value in crime prevention, 1" 1 and law review writers, with
possibly one exception,02 have long advocated the repeal or in-
validation of such provisions.'10  Seemingly, the courts at last
are moving toward the same position, so perhaps the legislature
would be well advised to follow the lead of New York, California,
and Illinois1o4 in repealing all of the status provisions and making
specific acts the grounds for arrest. Subsections 1, 4, 9, and the
second part of Subsection 2 should be put where they belong-
in the sections of the Criminal Code dealing with specific acts of
public intoxication,105 prostitution,10 gambling, 1 1 and pander-
ing. s Subsection 5, that wholly unnecessary and greatly abused
relic of the middle ages,109 should be repealed and forgotten.
Subsection 6 and the first part of Subsection 2 should undergo
study to determine whether such provisions really have a place
in the criminal law-indeed, whether they are even constitu-
tional. If such a study results in the retention of these provisions,
they and Subsection 3 should be removed and placed in an omni-
bus disorderly conduct statute.
99. City of Seattle v. Drew, 423 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1967).
100. LA. R.S. 14:107(1), (2), (4), (5), (9) (1950).
101. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and it8 Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
003 (1956).
102. Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1958).
103. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960)
Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603
(1956) ; Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of
Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 557 (1960) ; Comment, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102 (1962) ;
Notes, 20 ALA. L. REV. 141 (1967), 2 H~av. CIv. RTs.-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 439
(1967-68).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (Supp. 1966) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 35-1
(Supp. 1961) ; N.Y. REV. PENAL CODE § 240.35(6).
105. LA. R.S. 14:103(3) (1950).
106. Id. 14:82.
107. Id. 14:90.
108. Id. 14:84.
109. See note 103 supra.
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Louisiana's two loitering provisions are in no better position.
In fact, the case against them is possibly even stronger than
that against the status-type offenses. Subsection 7 and 8 are
definitely unsound and should be repealed. All of this would, of
course, enable the Louisiana Criminal Code to rid itself entirely
of the long outdated and even dangerous concept of vagrancy. 110
Assuming that most people agree that beside being unconsti-
tutional, status provisions have no value in law enforcement
and should be abandoned, it must be determined whether loiter-
ing provisions have value in crime prevention and whether they
can be drafted to escape a charge of unconstitutionality. It is
general knowledge that most public authorities honestly believe
that loitering provisions enable the police to prevent crime, but
it must be realized that while the prevention of crime is a
laudable objective, the "prevention" must not have the effect
of trampling individual liberties. Putting a person "on ice" be-
cause he is acting suspiciously is both undesirable and unconsti-
tutional.
The American Law Institute has attempted to solve the prob-
lem of balancing individual civil liberties with society's interest
in crime prevention in Section 250.6 of the Model Penal Code:
"A person commits a violation if he loiters or prowls in a
place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding
individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the
safety of persons or property in the vicinity. . . Unless flight
by the actor or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a
police officer shall prior to any arrest for an offense under
this section afford the actor an opportunity to dispel any
alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting
him to identify himself and explain his presence and con-
duct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this
section if the peace officer did not comply with the preceding
sentence, or if it appears at trial that the explanation given
by the actor was true and, if believed by the peace officer at
the time, would have dispelled the alarm."''
Unfortunately, this "model" provision does not solve any of the
constitutional problems inherent in all loitering provisions. The
word "alarm" is certainly just as vague as the words "common"
110. Dangerous in the sense that they can cause social unrest, abuse by the
police, punishment for innocent conduct, and suppression of free speech. See Note,
3 HA~v. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. REV. 439, 442 (1967-68).
111. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Off. Draft, 1962).
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or "suspicious ''1 12 and there is, therefore, no real standard given
as to when a policeman would have the right to demand ex-
planations for conduct. The words "dispel any alarm" also leave
much to be desired in the way of certainty. These defects are not
cured by saying the offender cannot be convicted if the court
believes his story because the words "dispel any alarm" are no
less vague for the court than for the policeman; and, in any
event, the damage has been done: the suspect has been arrested,
searched, booked, and held in jail until he could raise bond if,
indeed, he could. This is the true evil of such laws; they enable
the police to arrest, search, and "put on ice" all persons they
are vaguely suspicious of, the policeman only being required
to claim "alarm" and "unsatisfactory explanation." This is the
unlimited type of police-state power, the arrest on suspicion, that
the authorities should not and cannot under the Constitution be
permitted to have.
The police should have, however, reasonable powers to protect
property and citizens from harm without necessarily having
the power of arrest if the situation does not warrant it. A situa-
tion under which the police would have the power to protect
without having the immediate power to arrest is envisioned in
this writer's proposed provision:
A person commits the misdemeanor of disorderly conduct if
he loiters or prowls after 12:30 A.M. on a public way which
contains commercial or residential structures and manifests
an intent to, and the officer of the peace has probable cause
112. New York adopted Tentative Draft No. 13 of the MODEL PENAL CODE
for its new loitering section. N.Y. REv. PENAL CODE 240.35(6).
This provision requires that a party either identify himself or give a "rea-
sonable credible account of his purposes" if he is loitering "under circumstances
which justify suspicion that he may he engaged or about to engage in crime."
One New York Supreme Court judge has already expressed the opinion that be-
cause of this "suspicion" clause the law is unconstitutional: Murtagh, Status
Offenses and Due Process of Law, 36 FORDT mM L. REV. 51 (1967). The coin-
mentary attached to the Official Draft of § 250.6 explains that "suspicion" of
Tentative Draft No. 13 was excised in order to "save the section from attack and
possible invalidation as a subterfuge by which the police would be empowered to
arrest and search without probable cause." ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6,
comment at 227 (Off. Draft 1962). This fear was not unfounded because there
have been at least four cases -that have stated or strongly implied that suspicion
is not grounds upon which an officer can demand a "reasonable" or "satisfactory"
explanation: Dominguez v. City and County of Denver, 363 P.2d 666 (Ariz.
1961) ; Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1967) ; City of Port-
land v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210 P.2d 577, on rehearing, 187 Ore. 429, 210
P.2d 586 (1.949) ; City of Seattle v. Drew, 423 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1967). Califor-
nia's new vagrancy law, CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(3) (Supp. 1966), is also similar
to Tentative Draft No. 13, and it was upheld in People v. Weger, 251 Cal. App.
2d 584, 59 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047 (1968). This de-
cision by the California court has been heavily attacked. See Comment, 2 U. SAN
FRAN. L. REV. 337 (1968).
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to believe that, the actor is about to commit a criminal act
against persons or property on such public way; and the actor
does not remove himself from said public way within 15
minutes after being requested to do so by the officer of the
peace, if after said 15 minutes the officer requests of the
actor, and the actor fails to give, a credible and readily
provable account of his reasons for staying on said public
way other than the desire to wander along or loiter on the
public way.
If the court finds that the actor did indeed give the police
officer a credible and readily provable account of his reasons
for remaining on the public way, or that the actor manifested
no intent and the officer had no probable cause to believe
that the actor was about to commit a criminal act against
persons or property on the public way, the actor shall be
released from custody,113 all records of the arrest destroyed,
and any fruits of a search pursuant to an arrest under this
provision deemed inadmissable in any subsequent civil or
criminal proceeding.
This writer believes that such a provision achieves as nearly
as possible the ideal of preventing arrest on mere suspicion,
while preserving the state's right to protect the lives and prop-
erty of its citizens. While more exacting than "alarm," parts of
the provision do have rather vague standards. But as the provi-
sion stands, a police officer cannot take advantage of these neces-
sarily ambiguous words to make an immediate arrest. If the of-
ficer does make an arrest without observing the standards set
out in the provision, he is liable for false arrest.
There is a United States Supreme Court decision which in-
dicates that such a statute would survive constitutional attack.
In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,114 the Court was faced with
an ordinance which prohibited persons from standing or loitering
upon any street or sidewalk of the city after having been re-
quested by a police officer to move on. In the Court's opinion,
Justice Stewart stated that:
113. A provision allowing a policeman's judgment as to the validity of a
person's "account" to be determinative of guilt is unconstitutional. United States
v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256 (D.C. Pa. 1966) ; Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231
N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1967) ; People v. Bell, 306 N.Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d 821 (1953) ;
City of Seattle v. Drew, 423 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1967). Contra, People v. Weger,
251 Cal. App. 2d 584, 59 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1967) ; MeNeilly v. State, 119 N.J.L.
237, 195 A. 725 (1937).
114. 382 U.S. 87 (1967).
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"Literally read, therefore ... the second part of this or-
dinance says that a person may stand on a public side-
walk.., only at the whim of any police officer of that city.
The constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no
demonstration. It 'does not provide for government by clearly
defined laws, but rather for government by the moment-to-
moment opinions of a policeman on his beat.' Instinct with
its ever-present potential for arbitrarily suppressing First
Amendment liberties, that kind of law bears the hallmark of
a police state."11
However, Justice Stewart also said:
"The Alabama Court ... has thus authoritatively ruled that
1142 applies only when a person who stands, loiters, or
walks on a street or sidewalk so as to obstruct free passage
refuses to obey a request by an officer to move on ... As so
construed, we cannot say that the ordinance is unconstitu-
tional ..... ,16 (Emphasis added.)
The Court seemed to be saying that a provision limiting a
person's freedom of movement is valid if it is so narrowly drawn
that it is applicable only in a situation in which the state has a
genuine interest in preventing such movement. It is submitted
that the state does have a genuine interest in limiting movement
on a certain street when that movement presents probable and
imminent danger to persons and property on that street. The
proposed statute protects this interest, and is probably valid.
In conclusion, therefore, it can be stated that while most of Lou-
isiana's vagrancy provisions are invalid for a variety of reasons,
it does seem possible that statutes can be drafted that will
achieve the purpose underlying vagrancy-type laws which has
never been accomplished constitutionally--crime prevention.
Harry M. Zimmerman, Jr.
115. Id. at 90, 91.
116. Id. at 91.
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